The Glide Bomb War: Evolving Aerial Combat Over the Ukrainian Battlefield
In February of 2022, when Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian leadership sincerely believed occupying Ukraine would be quick and easy, with little effort required – akin to the fall of Baghdad, which took place just three weeks after the US invaded Iraq in 2003.
Now, nearly three years later, Russia has seen the reality: fierce resistance, unprecedented losses unseen since World War II, and an unraveling series of errors and serious operational issues affecting all aspects of the Russian armed forces. Glaring concerns in operational efficiency have persisted across all branches, but one branch in particular that truly underperformed at the start of the full-scale invasion was the Russian VKS, the agency responsible for fielding the Russian air force.
Early Airframe Losses
The ensuing days of battle were uniquely intense and dynamic. In the early hours of the war, Russian helicopters were running low-level sorties and conducting landing operations deep inside Ukrainian territory. One such landing site was in Kyiv’s Hostomil region, part of an effort to secure the Antonov airport for large-scale landing operations in Russia’s effort to capture Kyiv. These helicopter incursions faced heavy anti-aircraft fire, and many were shot down. The surprise attack was unexpected, but failed to achieve its goals. The catastrophic losses the VKS faced would keep surfacing up, as months into the war helicopters that were shot down over lakes and large bodies of water were still being fished out.
Russia’s fixed-wing aircraft also faced heavy losses, with a large portion of Russian airframes lost during the 2022 phase of the war, where Ukraine’s vastly outnumbered, technically inferior air force was able to fend off and inflict serious damage to the VKS.
These unsustainable losses meant the Russian command had to rethink its approach in using aerial assets, or risk losing too many of these precious airframes, most of which were inherited from the Soviet Union and cannot be replaced in sanctioned war-time Russia. The Ukrainian battlefield proved far too lethal for the VKS to try and establish air superiority. Almost in shame, the RuAF had to reduce its footprint in the war.
After the initial phase of the full scale invasion, Russian jets became confined to air missions as far behind the front lines as possible. Several close air support tasks that are usually conducted by helicopters and strike jets could no longer be done due to heavy anti-air presence. This factor applied to the Ukrainian Air Force as well, which found itself in a highly contested battlefield space, with a technologically superior adversary.
Both Ukrainian and Russian airframes started utilizing a technique in which unguided missiles were fired in an upward trajectory to maximize their range. These unguided missiles were never designed to be fired in such a manner. Traditionally designed to have the aircraft fire directly at a target at very close ranges to achieve any kind of accuracy, these missiles were now fired in an upward arc. This allowed the projectile to travel much further, but it became impossible to hit anything accurately, so these attacks were more often used as an area denial technique, stopping troops from moving forward or forcing them to retreat.
A Ukrainian Army Aviation Mi-8 sends a barrage of S-13 122mm rockets toward Russian lines. / Photo credit: Ukrainian Armed Forces
Dawn of the Glide Bombs
The VKS, however, did not remain subdued for long, and as early as 2023, a new VKS weapon began to make an impact on the battlefield: a new cheap, mass-produced version of the glide bomb.
Historically, the glide bomb traces its origins to World War II, when both the Axis and the Allies experimented with aerial bombs whose trajectory could be adjusted mid-flight. This technology would later evolve to what is categorized as “Precision-Guided Munitions”, or PGMs, sometimes known as “smart bombs” or “smart weapons”.
Modern glide bombs are launched from fixed-winged aircraft. The glide bomb is first strapped externally to hardpoints (mounting points) on the aircraft. After takeoff, the aircraft – usually a jet plane – accelerates to a high speed, and when possible tries to gain altitude. The aircraft then flies to a designated launch point and releases the bomb. Afterwards, the glide kit strapped to the bomb deploys adjustable wings. Most glide bombs don’t have any propulsion capabilities of their own, instead relying on the initial speed at which they are launched – the speed at which the aircraft was traveling at the moment the glide bomb was released. This means that as soon as the bomb is released it will start losing velocity. The deployed adjustable wings, coupled with the high speed of the aircraft, allows for much further travel distance compared to simply dropping the same type of bomb without a glide kit. The adjustable wings on a glide bomb also mean that it can update its flight path mid-flight, often relying on integrated Internal Navigation Systems (INS). The INS utilizes modern electronics that rely on different transmitters, receivers, and onboard computing capability, as well as satellite uplink connections to maximize and ensure targeting accuracy.
The extended range of the glide bomb, as well as the increased accuracy provided, means that aircraft launching this type of weapon can do so from relative safety, and further away from the front. Traditional “dumb bombs” are usually aimed by having the aircraft do “dive bombing” techniques, or utilizing special bombing sights that allow it to aim dropped bombs while flying over a target, preferably from a high altitude. However, this is not possible for either side in the war in Ukraine.
The USSR had huge stocks of traditional “dumb bombs”, and it is exactly these inherited stocks that Russia is going to rely on to be able to restart its air campaign, and eventually sustain heavy fire support.
Russia’s Expanding Glide Bomb Arsenal
At the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia had a number of munitions that were designed to be glide bombs from the ground up. The KAB-1500S-E was shown at international arm expos and various propaganda videos, but in reality these bombs were too complicated to manufacture to make a meaningful impact on the battlefield.
The KAB-1500S-E glide bomb, which never saw mass use. / Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons
In early 2023, the first public images and footage of a new, almost improvised, type of Russian glide bomb started circulating: the UMPK modified bomb. In the coming weeks and months, this new Russian weapon would make a real impact on the Ukrainian battlefield.
Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber with a 500kg bomb outfitted with a UMPK glide kit. / Photo credit: Russian MoD
The newly developed Russian UMPK glide kit is a universal design that converts old Soviet free-fall bombs into precision guided munitions that have enhanced range and accuracy. The design, although modern, is not very sophisticated. These bombs often ended up landing on Ukrainian positions, saturating the battlefield. However, the UMPK modified bombs also regularly land on Russian cities and territories due to high failure rates.
Although the design was severely lacking, and proved dangerous and often fatal to Russia’s own population, it was still deemed good enough by the VKS, and soon the number of attacks with these glide bomb kits increased almost exponentially. The relatively simple design of a glide bomb also meant it could be launched by most Russian fixed-wing aircraft, an asset the VKS has hundreds of. President Volodymyr Zelensky said 3,000 such bombs were dropped on the country in March 2024 alone. This relentless onslaught would soon start reaping significant results for the Russians. As we covered in our Documenting Losses in the 2022-2024 Avdiivka Offensive article, Russian glide bombs were instrumental in leveling and overwhelming the defense of the Ukrainian fortress city of Avdiivka. Since then, this glide bomb scourge has only ramped up.
Worse yet, the Russians started using large numbers of glide bombs to hit civilian targets, punishing the cities and regions that stood up to the initial invasion and onslaught of the full-scale invasion almost daily. Sumy and Kharkiv have become the targets of massive daily attacks, bombing the energy grid, vital infrastructure, and civilian housing and apartments. Russian glide bombs have become a new instrument of killing and demoralizing the Ukrainian population. Russian airfields in Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod and Voronezh provide numerous forward operating sites for glide bomb sorties.
By 2024, the glide bomb problem became so serious that Ukraine started utilizing its very few and very valuable Patriot anti-air batteries in an ambush role very close to the Russian border. On June 2024, U.S. Army Officers confirmed that a Patriot battery near the border with Russia destroyed several aircraft including helicopters, jets, and even Russia’s AWACS aircraft, the A-50. These types of daring attacks deterred Russian air activity, but did not drastically change the situation. The attacks were also left vulnerable due to their proximity to the front line, with strikes on Patriot battery vehicles published by the Russian MoD and Ukrainian obituaries linked to Patriot battery operators posted online.
Ukrainian Patriot battery with kill markings of various Russian aircraft, munitions, and drones. / Photo credit: Ukrainian Air Force
Another way Ukraine is trying to remedy the glide bomb problem is by hitting the storage locations of these bombs, as well as their assembly points. In recent weeks and months, several long-range drone strikes have penetrated Russian air defenses in order to take out large ammunition storage facilities, including, presumably, glide bomb storage next to airfields that field aircraft which launch glide bombs. This includes strikes as recently as September, where a large ammo depot in Tikhoretsk was hit. Previously, the Biden administration had long refused Ukrainian requests to use American-provided long range weapons such as the ATACMS ballistic missile to hit airfields and glide-bomb related targets inside Russia. However, after Trump won the 2024 US presidential election, and with only a few months left in office, the Biden administration has finally agreed to allow for long-range strikes inside Russia.
Screengrab from the September 20, 2024 Tikhoretsk glide bomb storage strike. / Photo credit: Telegram, @exilenova_plus
Ukraine’s Adoption of Glide Bombs
The Ukrainian Air Force has been using glide bombs and other PGMs on its aircraft as early as 2022-2023. In an impressive feat of engineering, the legacy Soviet aircraft in use by the Ukrainian Air Force were modified to mount and launch NATO-built glide bombs and PGMs. Aircraft such as the Mig-29, Su-27, and Su-24 would soon risk flying close to the front line to launch glide bombs at Russian positions, sometimes even inside Russian territory. As much of the aid Ukraine received, its glide bomb arsenal would be a mish-mash of various Western systems.
JDAM-ER under the wing of a MiG-29. / Photo credit: Ukrainian Air Force
The earliest Western glide bombs that the Ukrainian Air Force received were the JDAM GPS-guided glide bombs. Like many GPS-guided weapons, the JDAM performed poorly in an electronic warfare-saturated environment. Russian GPS jamming proved to be far too reliable, with some GPS-reliant weapons such as the Excalibur 155mm guided artillery shell having a failure rate as high as 90%. Other Western precision-guided munitions included the French AASM Hammer, modified JDAMs, and the modern GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb (SDB). These weapons proved effective in defeating Russian jamming methods, with various clips of successful Ukrainian air strikes between late 2022 and today.
Unlike most of Ukraine’s other weapon systems, many recently provided glide bombs are relatively new weapons. The JDAM-ER, a more advanced version of the JDAM, homes in on the location of GPS jamming equipment, making it very valuable in a Ukrainian battlefield environment, where Russia heavily jams GPS signals. Another modern glide bomb Ukraine has received is the GBU-39 or small diameter bomb (SDB). The SDB is smaller than other glide bombs, and allows for larger quantities of bombs being attached and dropped on targets, a regular GBU-39 pod is equipped with 4 separate bombs.
The US-provided GBU-39 has also been used heavily by Israeli Defense Forces in Gaza and Lebanon, in strikes across densely populated civilian areas which have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, underscoring the stark contrast between discriminate and indiscriminate use of the munition by US allies in Ukraine and the Middle East.
A lot of stakes are also being put on the arrival of F-16s on the Ukrainian battlefield, and although no one expects the F-16s to be a “wonder weapon”, there is a lot of hope they might improve the overall battlefield situation. F-16s could replace and supplement Ukraine’s aging fighter jet fleet. For now, Ukraine is mainly relying on its legacy Soviet fighter jets such as the Mig-29, Su-27, Su-24, and what little donated F-16s the Ukrainian Air Force has. Future deliveries are set to include French Mirage-2000 fighter jets, which are promised to arrive in small numbers with full logistical support.
Other potential fighter jets that could join the Ukrainian air fleet also include the Swedish Gripen JAS-39 – although there is no confirmation of this, there have been numerous talks about Ukraine acquiring JAS-39s in the past.
The Future of Glide Bomb Warfare
In the summer of 2024, several reports coming from Russian military bloggers started indicating a drop in Russian glide bomb efficiency. The already lacking design seems to be affected by Ukrainian electronic warfare tactics and jamming. The high failure rate of Russian glide bombs also still seems to be a problem, with regular reports of Russian glide bombs malfunctioning and falling on Russian cities and towns, with some incidents resulting in serious civilian casualties.
Russian development of glide bomb munitions, meanwhile, focuses on fitting increasingly larger bombs. 1,000kg, 1,500kg, and even 3,000kg bombs are fitted and tested with glide kits. In some instances, glide bombs with thermobaric oxygen-fuel munitions, also known as vacuum bombs, were tested on innocent Ukrainian villages located slightly behind the front line, with aftermath footage from these areas showing a devastating effect on the civilian population and decimation of local structures. The increased explosive load and destructive power of the bombs is intended to compensate for the poor accuracy and guidance characteristics which typically underly Russian glide bombs.
Russian FAB-1500M54 bomb fitted with a UMPK glide kit. Source: Zvezda News
As of the writing of this article, Russian glide bombs are still raining daily on Ukrainian front line positions, Ukrainian cities and towns, as well as Russian villages and towns.
At the start of Russia’s full scale invasion, Ukraine’s allies promised to stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes. Reality, however, turned out to be very different. Ukraine’s air force was hoping to have a significant fleet of modern F-16s to improve the combat situation on the ground. Glide bombs and other precision guided munitions would surely be an important ordnance for these airplanes, yet the United States has not provided a single airplane to supplement Ukraine’s tiny F-16 fleet.
Across four years of inaction and a functional policy of soft containment, the Biden administration squandered what valuable time it had to help aid Ukraine. The administration’s policy signaling towards Ukraine was purposeful ambiguity through obfuscation. This led to more Ukrainian land lost to Russia’s scorched earth policy and its unrelenting onslaught to occupy and subdue as much of Ukraine as it can.
With only days left in office, the Biden administration has finally agreed to the use of long-range weapons to hit military targets inside Russian territory. There are already large lists of potential targets for Ukraine to hit inside Russia, and military installations that facilitate the daily use of glide bombs are among these targets. Whether these attacks will work, what their scope is, and what impact they will bring to the battlefield is yet to be known. But one thing is for sure: for Ukraine, this decision has come very late, but better than never.
It is not clear what the Trump administration’s plan for the war in Ukraine will be, but as of the writing of this article, all the signs are pointing towards grim times for Ukraine. Whatever the future brings one thing is for sure: glide bombs will continue to define major aspects of the war moving forward, and remain a frightening and persistent reality for Ukrainian civilians and soldiers on the front lines.
